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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES  
 
This study contributes to the literature of management control systems as a 
package by examining the interrelationships between the control components. 
Moreover, the study aims at explaining the control configuration present at a 
Finnish technical wholesale company and identifying what type of relationships 
exist between the controls and which relationships seem more crucial than 
others.  
 
DATA SOURCES AND RESEARCH METHOD 
  
The theoretical references of this study encompass journal articles and books 
discussing MCS as a package, with a specific focus on examinations on the 
component interrelationships. The research was executed as an explorative case 
study. Empirical data was primarily collected from 35 interviews between 
January and August 2010, all of which were recorded and transcribed. 
Additionally internal written materials of the case company were utilized in the 
analysis. 
 
RESULTS 
 
The interrelationships of MCS elements were identified and categorized as 
complementary and supplementary. Complementary relationships were 
distinguished as those between the core control components of the package, with 
aligned behavioral control effect. Supplementary controls support the core 
control package, but do not directly align the behavior. In addition, this study 
argues for an alternative option to rigorous cybernetics-based control 
configurations. 
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TARKASTELU JOHDON OHJAUSJÄRJESTELMIEN VÄLISISTÄ SUHTEISTA 
 
 
TUTKIMUKSEN TAVOITTEET 
 
Tämä tutkimus osallistuu johdon ohjausjärjestelmäkokonaisuuksien 
tutkimukseen tarkastelemalla ohjauselementtien välisiä suhteita. Tutkimuksen 
tavoitteena on selvittää, mikä selittää tapaa, jolla ohjausjärjestelmäkokonaisuus 
suomalaisessa teknisen tukkukaupan yrityksessä on muotoiltu. Lisäksi 
tavoitteena on tunnistaa, minkä tyyppisiä suhteita ohjausjärjestelmäpaketin 
sisältä löytyy ja mitkä näistä suhteista vaikuttavat toisia tärkeämmiltä.  
 
TUTKIMUSMENETELMÄ JA LÄHDEAINEISTO 
  
Tutkimuksen teoreettinen lähdeaineisto koostuu johdon ohjausjärjestelmäkoko-
naisuuksia ja erityisesti järjestelmien välisiä suhteita käsittelevistä tieteellisistä 
artikkeleista ja kirjallisuudesta. Tutkimus toteutettiin eksploratiivisena case-
tutkimuksena. Empiirinen aineisto kerättiin ensisijaisesti 35 haastattelusta 
tammi-elokuussa 2010. Kaikki haastattelut nauhoitettiin ja aukikirjoitettiin. 
Lisäksi case-yrityksen sisäisiä kirjallisia materiaaleja hyödynnettiin analyysin 
tukena.   
 
TUTKIMUSTULOKSET 
 
Tutkimuksen tuloksena luokiteltiin ohjausjärjestelmien väliset suhteet 
komplementaarisiksi ja täydentäviksi. Komplementaariset suhteet muodostuvat 
ohjausjärjestelmän ydinkomponenttien välille, sillä ne ohjaavat yhtenäiseen 
käyttäytymiseen. Täydentävät ohjauskomponentit tukevat ydinkomponentteja, 
mutta eivät suoraan ohjaa käyttäytymistä. Lisäksi tutkimuksessa havaittiin 
kyberneettiselle ohjausjärjestelmälle vaihtoehtoinen tapa järjestää ohjaus.  
 
AVAINSANAT 
 
Johdon ohjausjärjestelmä, vuorovaikutussuhde, sisäinen yhtenäisyys, komple-
mentti 
 
KIITOKSET 
 
Tutkimuksen empiirinen data on kerätty yhteistyössä Mikko Sandelinin kanssa 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this empirical case study is to investigate management control systems (MCS) as a 
package with a special emphasis on attempting to identify the nature of the interrelationships 
between the various components of the package. The specific objective of the research is to 
explain why these controls appear together in the context of the chosen case company and to 
distinguish which relationships seem more crucial than others. With this approach the study 
aims to respond to the demand for qualitative empirical descriptions of MCS configurations 
and the interrelationships of MCS components in different contexts needed for the 
development of MCS theory (Otley, 1999; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Berry et al., 2009).  
 
Recently MCS have been subject to a fair amount of research with various suggestions of 
what constitutes a MCS package (Flamholtz et al., 1985; Simons, 1995; Merchant & Van der 
Stede, 2007; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Ferreira & Otley, 2009). However, prior empirical 
research has mainly focused on investigating a small control subset in isolation of the entire 
control package and other MCS components potentially affecting them. Contingency theory, 
which has perhaps been the dominant logic in MCS research, has provided important insights 
into the subject of MCS as well (see e.g. Drazin & Van de Ven, 1985; Milgrom & Roberts, 
1995), but the number of empirical studies tackling the joint effect of multiple control 
mechanisms has remained few. Therefore, many researchers have been expressing the need to 
gain empirical descriptions of the reality in which the MCS packages operate in order to fully 
understand whether the frameworks are going in the right direction in trying to describe the 
phenomenon (Otley & Berry, 1980; Flamholtz, 1983; Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Fisher, 1998; 
Otley, 1999; Malmi & Brown, 2008).  
 
The importance of studying MCS comprehensively stems from the recognition that making 
conclusions of the performance influence of a single control component without identifying 
the impact of other prevailing controls could easily lead to misleading conclusions (Fisher, 
1998; Chenhall, 2003). MCS have emerged as the means for managers to accomplish their 
task of coordinating and directing employees towards the goals of the organization. It is 
almost a norm for a contemporary organization to have numerous control systems at place, 
sometimes even without any further understanding of their collective effect on how 
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employees behave and what it means to bring a new control alongside with the already 
existing ones. Therefore, the practical motivation for investigating MCS as a package is to 
assist managers in designing and implementing more effective control systems which then 
would contribute to more effective operations (Otley, 1980; Flamholtz et al., 1985). 
 
While recently some researchers have been adopting the package approach to MCS in their 
case studies and provided important insights into the concept (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2004; 
Ahrens & Chapman, 2004; Tuomela, 2005; Mundy, 2010), a still rather unexplored area is the 
question of how the elements within a MCS package relate to each other. Malmi and Brown 
(2008) suggest that through examining the ways various MCS are used as parts of the 
organization‟s control mix a better understanding on the effectiveness of the individual 
elements could be achieved. Other researchers have also mentioned that understanding on 
how different controls could be combined to fit the specific circumstances of an organization 
is necessary for gaining knowledge on which controls actually are needed (Fisher, 1995; 
Chenhall, 2003). Despite the advances each of the existing theoretical frameworks has 
brought to our understanding of MCS, none of them really gives any specific tools in 
analyzing these interrelationships. Consequently, only few empirical studies have been 
addressing the issue (Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Sandelin, 2008).  
 
This empirical case study attempts to answer to these demands by providing a detailed 
description of a MCS package at a Finnish technical wholesale company, aiming at 
identifying the nature of the relationships between its control elements. The case company has 
been chosen as the site of research because its fairly simple control configuration seems 
significantly different from those of the company‟s main competitors. In addition, the 
company has constantly been outperforming its competitors in terms of profitability in a fairly 
competitive field with no chance of differentiation by products.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section addresses our existing 
knowledge concerning MCS as a package, mainly from the viewpoint of the interrelationships 
between control systems. The third section presents the research method applied, as well as a 
concise description of the research site and data acquisition processes. This is followed by the 
illustration and findings regarding the MCS package present at the case company. Finally, in 
the discussion section the empirical findings are analyzed in the light of previous knowledge 
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and in the concluding section central findings will be wrapped together and the study‟s 
contribution to MCS literature will be discussed. 
 
 
2. MCS INTERRELATIONSHIPS 
 
MCS have received several definitions in academic literature, ranging from encompassing 
strictly formal control mechanisms to covering a variety of informal controls of more implicit 
nature (e.g. Anthony, 1965; Ouchi, 1979; Flamholtz, 1983; Simons, 1995; Abernethy & Chua, 
1996; Fisher, 1998; Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Malmi & Brown, 2008). The breadth of 
different definitions of MCS has even grown to the extent that discussing and comparing 
MCS research has proved problematic (Fisher, 1998). This research is conducted utilizing the 
behavioral congruence viewpoint in defining MCS: the means to ensure that the behavior of 
the employees is consistent with the attainment of the organization‟s objectives (Merchant & 
Van der Stede, 2007; Malmi & Brown, 2008). By this definition MCS is seen to solve three 
types of management control problems: lack of direction, lack of motivation or personal 
limitations of the organizational actors (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007). Another widely 
used viewpoint on the purpose of MCS is the one of ensuring the accomplishment of 
organizational goals by aligning the goals of the employees with these mutual objectives 
(Flamholtz et al., 1985). The behavioral congruence approach is chosen for this study because 
it includes both formal management accounting based controls as well as motivators and 
incentives aimed at reinforcing behavioral congruence and recognizing that individual 
objectives might still differ from the ones of the organization.  
 
The variety of defining MCS is repeated in the definitions of what constitutes a MCS 
package. As a concept the term „MCS package‟ stems back from over 30 years (Otley, 1980), 
so the notion is definitely not new. The concept could be interpreted as referring to the issue 
that in most contemporary companies there is not only one management control system 
present, such as an incentive compensation system, but many others as well, which 
originating from different needs of different managers form the whole package of control 
systems under which the organization operates to achieve its goals (Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
The contents and uses of the package have been described and classified in several ways in 
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various frameworks (Flamholtz, 1983; Flamholtz et al., 1985; Simons, 1995; Otley, 1999; 
Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Ferreira & Otley, 2009). 
 
The concept of MCS as a package seems to boil down to the question that if we can identify a 
well-performing company with a certain visible control element, then why do not just every 
firm copy this feature and perform equally well? Contingency theory suggests that this is 
because contingent variables define an optimal control solution for each specific situation 
(Fisher, 1998). However, since this rarely seems to happen successfully even in the face of 
similar contingencies there has to be something more besides the particular best practices as 
themselves that make a certain company perform successfully. Milgrom and Roberts (1995, p. 
204) pointed out that the reason why copying one seemingly superior practice
1
 just won‟t do 
the trick is that the practice is “a part of a system of mutually enhancing elements, and that 
one cannot simply pick out a single element, graft it onto a different system without the 
complementary features, and expect positive results.” 
 
This kind of notice regarding some type of complementary or reinforcing relationship 
between MCS elements has been common in prior literature (Otley, 1980; Flamholtz, 1983; 
Merchant, 1985; Brickley et al., 1997; Alvesson & Kärreman, 2004; Kruis, 2008; Mundy 
2010). Despite all these notices, specific knowledge about the interrelationships between the 
components of MCS package has thus far remained fragmented and controversy (Chenhall, 
2003). One of the reasons for the fragmented results has definitely been the conceptual variety 
in describing the nature of relationships within a MCS. First of all, contingency theorists have 
been discussing fit in so many different forms that the comparisons between different studies 
has been difficult and conclusions perhaps even incorrect (Gerdin & Greve, 2004). The 
fundamental idea of contingent control literature is that desired outcomes are achieved 
through a correct match between contingent variables and the MCS package (Fisher, 1998). 
From the viewpoint of this study the matter of interest is not the fit or relationship between 
MCS and contingent variables, but rather the relationships between MCS elements. This has 
been somewhat noticed in contingency literature as well: for example Kennedy and Widener 
(2008) examined how different control components influence each other at the basis of two 
types of contingency-based definitions on fit. In addition, Drazin and Van de Ven (1985) 
described a systems approach to fit not only as the match between organizational structures 
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and processes with the set of contingencies facing the firm, but also as the internal 
consistency of the structures and processes in an organization. Furthermore, management 
literature has defined consistency of activities with performance declining if any single 
activity is changed alone without changes in the other activities (Porter & Siggelkow, 2008). 
 
The term „internal consistency‟ is used in more recent empirical MCS literature as well. 
Abernethy and Chua (1996) define the concept of control system package as the collection of 
internally consistent controls, in which internal consistency refers to controls being designed 
to achieve similar ends. This viewpoint is supported by Mundy (2010), who argues that the 
successful balancing of different MCS uses requires that the messages towards employees 
about desired behavior are coherent. Sandelin (2008), on the other hand, suggests a different 
viewpoint on the concept and argues that internal consistency is built from reciprocal 
processes, where “primary mode of control shapes the design of the control package whereas 
the use of the secondary modes of control complements the primary one” (ibid. p. 338). All of 
these researchers conclude that the functionality of MCS package appears to be dependent on 
its internal consistency, but do not further elaborate the nature or dynamics of it.  
 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) commented on complementarity as different control forms, 
rather than MCS elements as such, linking to, supporting and sustaining each other. They 
concluded that the two forms of control investigated in their case study, technocratic and 
socio-ideological, act as complements and cannot necessarily be handled separately. Sandelin 
(2008) also notes that none of the control elements present at the case company of his study 
was sufficient alone for achieving desired control effect, but required the existence of the 
other components of the control package. His main conclusion was the complementary 
reciprocal relationship between primary and secondary modes of control in the design and use 
of control packages.  
 
Economics-based literature has addressed the concept of complementarity more rigorously. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) defined elements to be complementary if the marginal benefit of 
element A increases with the level of B, and vice versa. Their mathematical modelings (1990, 
1995) on this definition have attempted to provide a formal method in identifying the fit 
between strategy and structure, for example. However, from the viewpoint of MCS 
component relationships this definition only indicates the mathematical relationships of the 
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investigated variables, and does not account for the purposes of MCS or the relative 
importance of the control elements. In addition, the organizational economics literature has 
also discussed management control from the viewpoint of organizational architecture. 
Brickley et al. (1997) defined delegation of decision rights, performance measurement and 
reward systems as the three primary components of organizational design and argue that when 
balanced correctly “like three legs of a stool” (ibid. p. 181) the control system consisting of 
these three elements provides a solution to controlling agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). These three blocks of organizational design have been researched considerably; in fact 
many of the quantitative empirical MCS investigations are examining these three components 
or different combinations or subsets of them. Some have found complementary relationships 
between the studied components (Abernethy et al., 2004; Widener et al., 2008), while others 
have recognized substitutional relations or no relationship at all (Nagar, 2002).  
 
Widener et al. (2008) have perhaps gone furthest with their examination on interdependencies 
between all the three primary organizational design components. Their results indicated 
complementary relationships between all of the three design components. However, this kind 
of complementarity conclusion based on statistical positive interdependency does not really 
assist in evaluating the importance of the relationships of a MCS package, since the mere 
increase in the use of two components is interpreted as a complementarity. In addition, the 
study does not make a difference between reciprocal and unidirectional relationships, but 
instead concludes both types as complementarities. Moreover, this view on MCS package by 
Brickley et al. (1997) is quite narrow and does not account for informal control mechanisms 
at all. 
 
In addition to complementary relationships, many researchers have been suggesting that the 
various elements of control might operate as substitutes to other control choices (Mintzberg, 
1983; Dent, 1990; Fisher, 1995; Abernethy & Chua, 1996; Huikku, 2007). Substitution is 
suggested by Fisher (1998) to be referring to the possibility of multiple control configurations 
resulting in similar outcomes. Consequently, all control systems would not need to be 
activated simultaneously. Substitutional relationships have been identified by Abernethy and 
Chua (1996), who noted that complex accounting controls may be substituted by simpler 
budgetary controls and sufficient non-accounting control mix elements. Huikku (2007) 
investigated whether alternate capital investment controls could act as substitutes for post-
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completion auditing (PCA), but ended up in the conclusion that adopting PCA rather acts as a 
complement to the existing controls. However, his findings also suggest that at least partially 
a more informal control practice can replace the adoption of a strictly formal one (PCA). 
Sandelin (2008) further extends the concept of substitution by arguing that a substitutional 
effect can be identified at a more comprehensive level of control modes as well, so that formal 
results controls could be substituted by more informal cultural, personnel and action controls.  
 
To sum up, it seems that we are lacking consistent concepts to describe and understand the 
variety of the relationships between MCS components. The concepts of fit, consistency and 
complementarity have been used in so many slightly differing ways that a coherent picture 
remains missing. For the purposes of this single-case study the economics-based definition on 
complementarity would not provide much value because the increase or decrease in 
performing a control activity cannot easily be identified. In addition, the economics-viewpoint 
ignores completely other possible substitutional or complementary effects than mere increases 
or decreases. Therefore, the viewpoint on internal consistency of MCS as achieving similar 
ends and supporting each other in directing the behavior is utilized in this study (Abernethy & 
Chua, 1996; Alvesson & Kärreman, 2004; Mundy, 2010). More specifically, this paper draws 
on analyzing the interrelationships of MCS elements from the viewpoint of the purpose of a 
control activity and the signal it mediates to the organizational actors. While the choices about 
the MCS characteristics are to describe what purpose the MCS serves, the interactions of the 
purposes are to reveal whether a set of MCS is mutually reinforcing in the pursue of aligned 
behavior. The identification of signals is essential for the purpose of behavioral alignment to 
be fulfilled, because a control element can serve alternative purposes, or, respectively, many 
alternative controls can serve the same purpose. 
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3. RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN 
 
This empirical case study draws on explorative methods in order to gain knowledge on the 
essence of the controls present at the case company and further enlighten current academic 
knowledge on MCS component interrelationships. Case study method was chosen because it 
provides the means to go deep into the structures of the organization and reveal the 
fundamental relationships between MCS package components in order to facilitate 
understanding of the comprehensive use of these controls within a single organization 
(Ahrens & Dent, 1998; Otley, 1999, Berry et al., 2009). 
 
The study was conducted at a Finnish technical wholesale company, TechWholesaler Ltd.
2
, 
henceforth referred to as TWS. The company is a medium-sized country unit of a Nordic sub-
group and further part of a large European group, employing roughly 350 people in 27 offices 
around Finland. The case company was chosen for this research because of its history of 
making excellent profits compared with its main competitors, which makes it interesting to 
examine how management control issues are being tackled at the company. Another issue 
contributing to the suitability of the chosen case company is the fact that it is not too 
complicated in terms of size and organizational structure which might be of help in gathering 
adequately information to get a comprehensive view of the entire package (Malmi and Brown, 
2008). Instead, in a larger organization bureaucratic structures and processes might easily be 
concealing informal control practices (Mitchell & Reid, 2000). 
 
The primary empirical data for the research consists of 35 semi-structured interviews 
conducted between January and August 2010, with most of the interviews taking place in 
June (see appendix A for a complete list of the interviews, and appendix B for the interview 
outline). The interviewees represent all levels of the organization: senior management, middle 
management, as well as employees from the functions of warehousing, sales and purchasing. 
The coverage of all organizational levels is important in order to gain profound understanding 
on the use of MCS and, consequently, the true nature of each control component (Ferreira and 
Otley, 2009). The interview material adds up to a total of 43 tape-recorded non-stop hours of 
interviews, all of which were transcribed. The average duration of the interviews was 
                                                 
2
 The name of the case company has been changed for guaranteeing anonymity. 
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approximately one hour and they were conducted at the head office and five local offices 
around the country. For the purpose of retaining the anonymity of the company, the local 
offices (profit centers) included in the interviews have been renamed for this study as Alpha, 
Bravo, Charlie, Delta and Echo.  
 
In addition to the interviews, frequent informal discussions were conducted by the interviewer 
around the research subject. These discussions provide important additional insights to the 
interview data. As interviews were proceeding the understanding reached so far was widely 
utilized in refining the themes of subsequent interviews. Moreover, specifying inquiries could 
be made in retrospect when needed. To further improve data triangulation, some internal 
written materials were also received from the case company for the purposes of this research. 
These include for example strategy materials and the latest employee satisfaction survey.  
 
Data analysis was conducted by listening to the interview tapes and reading through the 
transcriptions several times with the aim on attempting to identify the key elements of TWS‟s 
MCS package. The theoretical classifications of MCS by Simons (1995), Merchant and Van 
der Stede (2007) and Malmi and Brown (2008) as well as the organizational design 
component framework by Brickley et al. (1997) were all utilized in this process of 
identification in order to gain a comprehensive look on the possible control elements present 
at the company. The recognized control elements were grouped together according to each of 
these frameworks and these groupings were compared to each other in order to find the most 
suitable one to assist in analyzing the interrelationships of the components. While all of the 
discussed frameworks provide important insight for this study, none of them addresses the 
nature of control component interrelationships and therefore cannot be expected to be able to 
explain the empirical findings alone regarding the main objective of the study. This is why the 
empirical description does not rigidly follow any of the existing frameworks, but rather draws 
on the information gained from them in the attempt of recognizing how the MCS elements 
present at the case company relate to each other. 
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4. A MCS PACKAGE DESCRIPTION 
 
Background of the company 
TWS began its operations in 1995 when the company‟s designated CEO and a number of 
others decided to leave their current employer operating in the field of technical wholesale, 
and build up a competing business of their own. The new company was established as a 
country organization operating under a Baltic-area based group, which later became part of a 
large European multinational currently operating in more than 60 countries.  
 
The two corner stones of TWS‟s strategy were fast determined as providing the best customer 
service of the industry and having the most cost-efficient operating model. These dimensions 
were, according to the CEO, the two key factors which the company could influence with its 
own efforts. The former of the two was seen as the best way for differentiation in the industry 
where all the participants basically sold “the same product to the same customers at the same 
price”, as the CEO described. To serve the target of providing superior customer service, a 
decentralized network of local fast-delivery warehouses was established to form the basis of 
the company‟s structure. While decentralization seemed more costly than centralization, a 
very lean organization was established to drive cost-efficiency. These strategic choices and 
assumptions related to them have remained untouched during the fifteen years of TWS‟s 
operations, even though in 2005 the Baltic mother group of TWS was acquired by a European 
multinational. This change in the ownership brought along significant pressures for 
formalizing the operating principles and procedures at TWS. However, the company‟s 
management has firmly believed in the adopted management model and fought for the 
continuance of their well-perceived practice of operations. 
 
Throughout its history the company has continued to grow organically focusing only on those 
areas of business in which they could perform at their best and that way beat up competition. 
The strategic objectives of the company have remained the same. In fact, the only strategic 
objective has been to grow every year five percent faster than the market. Besides the 
numerical objective, the company has specified vision statement that the CEO addressed with 
the following words: 
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“No organization can operate well without its participants sharing the same view, the same 
belief about the future and thus, the same preconceptions and shared experiences within the 
organization.” 
 
While emphasizing shared future beliefs, the CEO continued on more detailed meanings of 
the vision statement: 
 
“Hence, we believe that by encouraging TWS employees to personal development, and by 
enabling them to express themselves, and by allowing them to do the job as they wish, we think, 
we will achieve such a service level and productivity what we are aiming at.” 
 
The focus on employees and especially their possibility for autonomous conduct are, as will 
be shown, guidelines for organizational design that is believed to facilitate critical success 
factors of service level and productivity (efficiency). Moreover, the CEO further explained 
the vision statement and came to the very core of it:  
 
“But even if we did not achieve better service, even if we did not manage to make the company 
more secure employer and more productive, all that would be worth of trying. It would be worth 
of trying just because it is right. Thus, we TWS employees want to respect our work and the 
success of this company. This is the way of ensuring our position.” 
 
The last part of the vision statement essentially points toward entrepreneurship. The vision 
statement is not about setting targets or direction as much as it is about laying ground for the 
internal mindset – the culture of the company. With these minimum mechanisms of setting 
strategic direction, namely means of a single specified growth objective and vision statement, 
the company has succeeded well in terms of performance. In 2010 TWS holds second 
position at the market with presence at 25 localities around Finland, while specifically in 
pick-up business the company has reached market leadership.  
 
 
Structural choices and delegating decision rights 
Contrary to the common practice of centralizing purchasing and warehousing in the retail and 
wholesale business, TWS‟s decision was to rely on radical decentralization. Working on 
against consultancy advice and mainstream carried high risk, but the management was 
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convinced that not only sales but also purchasing and warehousing had to be decentralized in 
order to gain strategic advantages. Each local office became to have its own purchasing, 
warehousing, sales and management functions, so that a local office would appear like the 
company in a smaller scale. The decisions about the product mix, warehouse levels, suppliers, 
logistics, and customers were to be made within an office, “within a mini-company”, rather 
than at a distance. This structural choice of decentralization established settings for local 
adaptation to customer needs. It also set office managers into an entrepreneurial position 
having all the necessary resources in their command. Other functions were centralized, with 
minimum staffing, to support the performance of the offices. 
 
The decision to structurally decentralize the core functions was not an independent choice. To 
make a local office appear as the company in miniature to as high extent as possible and to 
translate the vision of the entrepreneurship into action, the senior management paid specific 
attention to the administrative structures of the company. The underlying idea was to promote 
the vision of entrepreneurship by assigning authority and responsibility to the front line, as the 
CFO commented: 
 
“The idea is that people carry responsibility for their actions, they are given chance to make 
decisions and they are supported. They are the experts of their fields. Of course we need some 
coordinating forces; I mean that we need to check that we are going to the same direction and 
that we know where we do stand.” 
 
The key decisions were made about decision authority, responsibility, and incentives. In 
addition, specific attention was to be paid on coordination, support, and viability of a 
particular kind of culture. These choices have remained the same since the establishment 
although constant fine-tuning is made in daily practices and information systems.  
 
In addition to the fact that the company is radically decentralized in terms of core functions, 
there is also very little hierarchy present at TWS: the organizational levels consist of the head 
office, business regions, and local offices. However, only head office and local offices are 
considered as accounting entities, and local office managers (named profit center managers in 
the company language) report directly to the head office. The key organizational unit at TWS 
is the local office, or profit center. The role of business managers, as described by the CEO, is 
one of “supporting and coordinating the offices placed at their regions”. Besides this 
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coordinating role, the business managers are responsible for company-wide development 
programs, and they also form the management board with the CEO, the CFO and the 
Purchasing Director. Two of the four business managers are in addition profit center 
managers, but respectively having smaller regions to coordinate. 
 
In fact, profit center managers are perceived to be operating nearly as local CEOs of their 
units due to the freedom of decision-making regarding the key functions and processes at the 
office. Some examples of the matters under the responsibility of the profit center managers 
are taking care of employee healthcare, security and maintenance of the unit, and contracting 
with local transportation companies. The profit center manager of Bravo described his 
position by stating: ”In practice I’m local CEO since I need to make contracts with cleaners, 
maintenance, etc.” He continued on the operational autonomy by providing the following 
example:  
 
“We have very little rules here. Earlier we were constrained only by Finnish Criminal Act. For 
example, once I reviewed our equipment and realized that the fax machine is not good enough 
for us. So I took it to an office equipment store and got a good resale price and a new machine. 
When I informed the accounting apartment about my purchase a problem came up – the old 
machine was on lease hold.” 
 
The autonomy of operations extends beyond the profit center managers as well. For example 
the salesmen and purchasers are allowed to conduct their tasks very independently. This 
brings most of the business decisions to the people in the front line who are perceived to be in 
the best position to evaluate, for example, what are the most demanded products in their 
particular business area. The CFO described: 
 
”The idea is that people are given the chance to make decisions and they are supported. They 
are the experts of their fields.” 
 
The profit center manager of Bravo shared this view: “There is no such a smart manager in 
this company that he would know any issue better than the one who works with these issues 
on daily basis.” This indicates, as the manager continued, “we are allowed to make 
mistakes.” 
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The minimum number of organizational levels with extensive delegation implies that 
decisions are not made through hierarchy. The underlying idea is that the one who identifies a 
problem is also the best one to solve it, irrespective of the organizational level. Everyone is 
encouraged to act like an entrepreneur. The profit center manager of Bravo clarified this 
mindset as follows: 
 
“Sometimes I find it kind of funny when a salesman comes to you with a huge problem expecting 
you to help him solve it. You ask him what he thinks would be the best solution to the problem. 
Then the salesman tells you his solution, and you just nod and totally agree with him. After all, 
the salesman is the expert in his field.” 
 
The underlying reason for functional decentralization and extensive delegation of decision-
making authority is to enable adaptation to local customer needs. According to the purchaser 
of Bravo, this allows for local trade-offs and enables competitiveness: 
 
”With the decentralized warehousing for example, which to me as a purchaser is close to my 
heart, it feels that we can respond to the local needs in so many more different ways than our 
competitors.” 
 
Moreover, the delegation of decision rights allows for offering tailored local product mix and 
thus contributes both customer service and cost-efficiency. On the other hand, delegation is 
also considered a prerequisite for employee satisfaction which in turn is seen to improve 
customer service as well. Customer service, according to the CEO, “is an immediate 
reflection of the well-being of the personnel and employee satisfaction.” He continued on the 
well-being as follows: “I believe that it stems from the fact that they are able to express 
themselves.”  
 
The extensive delegation is not unproblematic, however. The controller illustrated the 
freedom resulting from delegation very aptly: “In one of these meetings someone stated pretty 
well that there is merely a fine line between operational freedom and abandonment.” 
Nonetheless, without exception the interviewees at all levels of the organization felt that the 
freedom of executing one‟s tasks independently and choosing the best ways of action 
themselves is definitely an appreciated feature of their job, as the purchasing manager of 
Charlie commented: 
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”I think one of the best features of how the CEO has been managing the company is that 
decision-making is placed in the customer interface where the actual work is done as well. And 
not having the head office compiling all these rules of operations to be distributed downwards 
to the field.” 
 
In addition, the warehouse manager of Alpha described: 
 
“It illustrates well that when you hear our new guys talking to their friends in the phone back 
there, they are constantly expressing how good place this is to work and how great it is when 
bosses are not lurking behind your back but rather let you do your own job.” 
 
The autonomy of the local offices reflects to the role of the head office and management 
group as well. The head office with all its functions is intended to serve and support the local 
offices. “Our purpose is to make the life of the units as easy and comfortable as possible so 
that they can run their operations at the best way possible with as little distractions as 
possible,” explained the CFO. For example, the Group requires the subsidiaries to compile a 
five-year plan and annual budgets. At TWS the CEO and CFO prepare these without the 
involvement of the rest of the organization. On the other hand, the Group also requires 
reporting and compliance to EHS
3
 policies. This reporting requirement, as well as financial 
planning, is filtered by the CEO and CFO. Moreover, when it comes to the purchasing 
function only major international purchases are made centrally by the purchasing director, 
otherwise each unit has their own purchaser working at the site of operations right next to 
warehousing and sales functions. According to a founder of the company this enables a better 
response to the actual circumstances rather than dealing with things from a distant purchase 
center of some sort: 
 
“We have never liked the idea of all the purchasers sitting on their own in some mutual office. 
This is why they are placed in the units where they even might see some real customers as 
well.” 
 
                                                 
3
 Environmental, health and safety 
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A purchaser at profit center Echo commented on the same topic: 
 
“If I sat in some office, it is very likely that I would have more like a tunnel vision on this. I 
would see nothing else, I mean, whether salesmen are busy, whether phones are ringing, 
whether truck drivers are coming and going, whether warehouse staff is having time for a chat 
or for a cup of coffee.” 
 
Similarly to purchasing, no other centralized support functions like HR or marketing were 
created because they were only seen as unnecessary additional costs when decision rights had 
been delegated so deeply into the organization. In a similar vein, the role of the management 
board is to support the local offices. Although the management board monitors profit center 
performance on a monthly basis, primarily based on budget reviews, it is not involved in 
making operative decisions. Since the basic strategic assumptions have not been subject to 
change during the entire life span of the company, no formal strategy-making procedures are 
present, either. The primary role of the management board lies more in subtle coordinative 
and supportive actions.  
 
While management board and nominated regional managers provide support to local offices, 
the functional steering groups in purchasing, warehousing and sales serve the same purpose. 
These steering groups consist of experts from the largest offices and typically they convene in 
a teleconference on a monthly basis. They seek to develop and search for the most effective 
ways of operations and provide an important source of support to the employees in a 
decentralized organization. However, the initiatives introduced by the steering groups are 
subject to the acceptance of profit center managers, so whether the decisions of these groups 
actually make a difference is dependent on profit center managers. A business manager 
playing also the role of a profit center manager (Alpha) summarized the autonomy of local 
offices and its implications as follows: 
 
”I have absolutely enough autonomy as a profit center manager, but as a business manager, the 
profit center structure limits my authority. […] The implementation of management group 
decisions in profit centers is sometimes extremely challenging, because you cannot step over the 
profit center managers’ authority. We are very delicate to protect that authority…” 
 
To sum up, operational activity and decisions are conducted in the local offices. All other 
bodies of management board, steering groups, and regional managers are to support these 
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entities rather than monitor or control their plans and performance. Structural decentralization 
and extensive delegation enable entrepreneurial activity, an independent running of business 
in the local office.  
 
 
Measuring performance 
Performance measurement at TWS is organized around the local offices; business regions are 
not considered as accounting entities. Although called profit centers in the company language, 
the offices are measured at a broader aggregate measure: the economic value added (EVA). 
Consequently, they are held accountable not only for profit and loss but for cost of capital as 
well. Instead of defining strict targets for costs and revenues in detailed line-item budgets, the 
company respects the autonomy of the units and measures performance by an aggregate 
measure. EVA is thought to effectively capture the responsibilities of a profit center manager 
without consisting of too many complicated measures and calculations. The CEO explained 
that “the measure is clear, simple, and the same for everyone”. The CFO further mentioned 
that additional measures are not wanted to be hanging over employees because that would 
ruin the atmosphere and sense of responsibility currently prevailing at the company.  
 
The aggregate nature of EVA gives plenty of room for the profit center managers to make 
decisions regarding revenues, expenses and working capital. Thus performance measurement 
at TWS does not really direct attention at any specific component of profitability, or directly 
at cost efficiency. Since warehousing plays an important part in TWS‟s business especially 
regarding cost efficiency, the significance of working capital management has been 
emphasized by specific accounting choices: besides already bearing their share of capital 
costs in the EVA-based measurement, the head office overhead costs are allocated to the 
profit centers on the basis of capital employed, too. This way attention is directed towards 
managing the size of the warehouse, receivables and payables, which as components of 
capital employed have direct effects on the quantity of overheads received.  
 
The allocated overhead costs are shown as a separate line item in the profit centers‟ monthly 
P&L statements, which the profit centers follow and examine carefully. The controller 
explained that they are extremely conscious of the overheads: they are quickly calling to the 
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head office if costs begin to rise or if they feel they have received too much allocation. He 
further described the issue as follows: 
 
“Many times they call and wonder why these specific costs have now risen. Or ask where their 
sales margin has disappeared when they had been expecting this and this much more, wanting 
to know all of the adjustments probably affecting it.” 
 
Similarly to performance measurement the CEO has wanted to keep the overhead allocation 
base simple and understandable, as he explained: 
 
“In my philosophy it is extremely important that the allocated overheads are simple and as 
translucent as possible. This is because all the time you need for discussing or explaining them 
is just a waste of time.” 
 
When it comes to measuring other aspects than financial ones, the practices at TWS are 
definitely playing a minor role. Although the CEO mentions four non-financial aspects that 
the company aims to follow at a regular basis (customer and personnel satisfaction, 
availability development and the number of complaints), in practice the employees seem to 
have the skill and expertise to gain the same or even better knowledge from their immediate 
surroundings without waiting for the actual measured results. For instance, instead of being 
dependent on actual customer satisfaction measurements once or twice a year, people try to 
catch the signals from their everyday operations, as the warehouse manager of Echo stated: 
 
“When you don’t receive any feedback (from customers) or the phone doesn’t ring, it means 
that everything is proceeding smoothly and the customers are happy.”  
 
Another applicable example is that the numerical measure developed for following 
availability development is not considered suitable enough for its purpose by the purchasers at 
the profit centers. Rather than relying on this easily misinforming formula the purchaser of 
Bravo mentions a simpler way of keeping in touch with the availability development: 
 
“Actually what I consider more as an availability measure is the fact how much I hear feedback 
in the corridors on how goods weren’t sufficient or I didn’t get enough or things were left into 
post-delivery.” 
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This kind of reliance on informal daily feedback has been enabled by the structural choice of 
decentralizing the key functions, such as warehousing or purchasing. The company could 
have constructed a detailed scorecard for measuring and following turnovers, but instead they 
saw that a better way was to respect the autonomy of the profit centers and create the premises 
so that the business can be controlled and directed without too fastidious measurements and 
boundaries set by the head office. This supports the profit center managers‟ freedom of 
directing their units into the direction they feel most suitable for that particular unit. 
Moreover, according to the CFO the monitoring of profit center performance is mainly the 
responsibility of profit center managers: 
 
“I think that something must be totally wrong if I need to constantly monitor and lurk what is 
going on in a unit. It is their responsibility to keep the shop in shape.” 
 
EVA is calculated at a monthly basis side by side with basic profit and loss statements and 
reported publically in the company‟s internal reporting system so that everyone can see and 
compare how other offices are performing. Although no kind of formal competition is 
established between salespeople or local offices the public figures are seen as a significant 
motivator of trying to keep up with the neighboring units. The business manager of South 
described: 
 
“I would say that nine film stars (salesmen) out of ten read their sales figures very closely when 
they are public. Everyone can see them, everybody’s sales and accumulated margins. So I 
believe that it has a big directing effect.” 
 
The management control at TWS is not based on predictive logic: planning is conducted 
separately from operational functions. The company does compile a company-wide five-year 
plan, which is updated every spring to roughly outline the future and serve as a starting point 
for the financial budget for the following year. However, this seems more like compliance to 
the practices of the Group than an actual control component. This is because, according to the 
purchasing director, the plan is mainly built up by the CEO and CFO and then delivered to the 
Group without much getting back to the delivered numbers later on. Action plans, on the 
other hand, are created in the minds of the profit center managers or operational managers and 
20 
 
not regulated by the head office. For example, warehouse manager is most likely the one to be 
developing plans for how the warehouse at profit center Bravo should be functioning.  
 
Annual budget, although constructed and shown in the monthly reports, does not create a 
control effect at TWS. The intention of the budget is not to serve as target, as the CEO 
explained: 
 
“For us the budget is not binding and we do not reward for keeping the budget. We would 
rather see it so that the budget would represent the optimistic-realistic outlook of the following 
year at the time it is being prepared.” 
 
This view seems consistent with the autonomous character of the profit centers: essentially 
the budget is thought to assist profit center managers in planning and anticipating their future 
actions. According to the CFO possible large deviations from the budget at profit center level 
are discussed by business managers with the profit center in question: 
 
”[if a unit underperforms] we do not point with a stick nor do we ask any detailed plans for 
corrective actions. Our culture is rather to discuss and wonder.” 
 
This type of practice allows people to make their own choices about critical issues and 
occasions at their responsibility area, and thus creating commitment into the choices they 
have made. Actually, many of the operational managers consider using previous year‟s 
realized figures as a point of comparison much more informative than the budget. The profit 
center manager of Charlie explains: 
 
“I personally consider following trends more important than comparisons with the budget. This 
winter (2010) provides a typical example, because at the time the budgets were set there was a 
pretty uncertain situation: we knew that okay, now we are already at the bottom so the direction 
is probably upwards, but in what manner? The presumption was that this winter would become 
even tougher than it actually proved to be. And now we easily boast about beating the budget, 
but the budgets have been based on mere guesswork from January to March.” 
 
Performance measurement at TWS thus strongly focuses on following EVA as the main 
measure. Operational measures are followed, too, but not because of dictations from above or 
targets set by the management. Instead, the employees and profit center managers know 
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themselves well which are the measures or signals they should be aware of in order to run 
their daily operations smoothly. Quite surprisingly the measurement practices at TWS do not 
include any formal financial target setting at all, not by annual budget nor anything else.  
 
 
Rewarding employees 
The operational freedom granted to the people by the choices about delegation of decision 
rights and performance measurement enables employees‟ inherent motivation to prosper, 
because they are allowed independently to contribute to the daily operations with individual 
skills and capabilities, as the CFO commented: “You cannot motivate anyone, but you can 
create premises in which a person can become motivated, find one’s motivation.” Since 
individual motivations, however, are not necessarily aligned with the interests of the 
company, TWS has also set a formal incentive system based on financial rewarding. The 
purpose of these rewards is to achieve “best service with the lowest costs”, as the CEO 
commented. In other words, these rewards are for directing behavior towards the company 
goals. The CEO described financial rewarding as follows: 
 
“Some, not all, salesmen have very minor sales commissions, but the most significant 
performance-based pay is for the team, I mean, for the profit center. They are rewarded very 
generously, if they succeed. ” 
 
Individual rewards are very rare. Some commissions exist just because by granting them, the 
company has avoided permanent salary increase. The core of the rewarding focuses on team-
performance. In line with portraying a profit center as the company in smaller scale, the profit 
center performance is evaluated by EVA. The CEO further explained the underlying 
rewarding philosophy: 
 
“We reward only for results, not for anything else. [...] We have no capped model, but just plain 
mathematics. We have no different criteria, I mean, if you achieve these numbers then you will 
get 15% and if you will achieve those numbers, then you will get 10% and so forth. Nothing like 
that. We have made the system crystal clear, because otherwise there will be too much debate.” 
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To avoid game-playing and unnecessary debate, performance contracts are the same for each 
profit center. Profit center EVA determines the size of the bonus pool. On the other hand, the 
people at the head office and business managers are rewarded based on company level EVA. 
This is because their role is to serve profit centers and make them to co-operate for the best of 
the whole company. However, the reasoning behind rewarding each profit center only on its 
own performance is clear, as the CFO explains: 
 
“We do embrace a fairly pure profit center mindset. Why should we punish the people at Bravo 
if Delta is underperforming?” 
 
More precisely, 10 percent of the after-tax EVA is the bonus pool to be distributed to the 
staff. Three criteria are applied in determining individual bonus: one third is divided 
according to headcount, one third in proportion to salaries and one third based on judgmental 
appraisal by the profit center manager. While the rewarding system seeks to promote equity 
and team-effort, the subjective performance evaluation component seeks to resolve possible 
free-riding problems. In addition, the reward system at TWS does not include a cap: the 
higher EVA an office produces, the more people receive as compensation. Thus, there is an 
incentive for entrepreneurially seeking more effective processes and practices. 
 
The company sets no target for performance; compensation is received every time EVA 
merely is produced. The CEO defends this procedure as follows: “I am against target setting 
because EVA calculation already takes into account owners’ expectation in the capital 
charge.” He also wants to avoid unnecessary debate of determining appropriate targets, waste 
of time on such debates, and ambiguity of what is deemed appropriate performance. 
 
The CEO emphasizes that the choice to base the annual compensation on team (profit center) 
performance is one of the key issues to ensure cooperation of different functions and thus 
smooth running of the order-delivery process within the profit centers. However, the current 
compensation system may also encourage sub-optimized behavior. That is, the people at the 
local offices may only strive for the best of their own unit rather than what would be best for 
the company as a whole. The profit center manager at Echo describes the issue: 
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“The fact that EVA is profit-center-specific makes it kind of a sub-optimization factor. I mean in 
practice then for example Echo and Foxtrot are each other’s competitors, and in that sense it is 
just fine that it (the annual bonus) won’t count for half of the yearly salary, because then things 
could be turning pretty interesting.” 
 
The company has sought to overcome such competitive dysfunctions by dedicating customers 
to profit centers. The selling unit gets the revenues and if the products are delivered by 
another unit, then delivery costs are allocated to the selling unit on the basis of transfer prices. 
The compensation system induces very strict cost consciousness. The extreme cost-efficiency 
was apparent in stories. Whether this awareness is already at too high a level to prevent profit 
center managers from making investment decisions can be contemplated because when yearly 
EVA is the only measure followed there is practically no explicit incentive to encourage 
longer-term thinking in terms of investments. The controller commented on the flipside of 
cost consciousness: 
 
“Regarding accounting the major problem is indeed the fact that it takes courage from the 
decision maker to reason an investment decision to the employees and push your idea through. 
It has to contain long-term focus, we cannot only be optimizing the result for this year. Instead 
we have to make sure that growth and profitability are continued in the following years as 
well.” 
 
As much as EVA is followed and costs thus kept down with every possible means, the 
incentive system based on the yearly profit center EVA seems to be appreciated by the 
employees because of its decent ability of producing monetary rewards for each member of 
the organization and not being just a sales provision for certain people. The real motivational 
or committing effect of the annual bonus can be seen controversial, however. When directly 
asked about the motivational effect of the EVA-based compensation most of the employees 
saw it as one of the minor drivers of motivation. For example the warehouse manager at 
Bravo commented: 
 
”The annual bonus or receiving it a bit more than before really is not the thing that motivates. 
The main point is that operations are aimed towards producing more EVA, both for the 
company and for us. The reward is only one consequence of doing your job well. 
 
What comes to the other common purpose of compensation systems, namely commitment 
building, the interviewees mainly commented the one-year payment period being too sparse 
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for creating actual commitment to the company. Near the payment date in March people 
might consider not leaving the company before receiving the annual compensation, but 
otherwise it is not the money that would seem to keep the people at the company. As a 
salesman at Delta replied when asked whether annual EVA payment creates commitment to 
the company: 
 
“But I don’t see it (EVA) much engaging me to this job. If I wouldn’t like it here otherwise then 
EVA wouldn’t keep me here either.” 
 
However, it might perhaps be a little naive to claim that the annual bonus has no motivational 
or committing influence. The purchasing manager of Delta put this well in words: 
 
“I think that regardless of what people say the annual bonus is definitely one of the factors 
committing the people to this company. Although it does not remain in your mind for too long, 
but likewise you never remember a rise in salary for much longer than a few months.” 
 
After all, EVA-based bonus does direct attention at profitability and team effort as well as 
facilitates entrepreneurial atmosphere, which in turn clearly is appreciated by the employees. 
Consequently, although not directly stated it seems that the reward system might nevertheless 
have an effect on how people build their motivation. 
 
Besides pure monetary reward systems another way traditionally perceived to create 
commitment is to establish non-financial reward systems, such as training programs. 
However, no such formal non-financial reward systems are present at TWS. This is something 
the CEO sees as a difficulty and expresses his worry of whether the employees are thanked 
enough for their efforts. Regarding training the business manager of East stated: 
 
“We actually have very little such training, or with a bit of exaggeration the philosophy goes so 
that if we have a person who does not know how to read or calculate then we teach him how to, 
but we don’t have such proper systematic training plan for people. We do have a sales training 
et cetera to be presented to the group, but these are more for the purpose of the group letting us 
alone.” 
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The non-financial rewards thus remain modest at TWS and consequently are of little help in 
commitment-building. Informal recognition of good performance of duties is not found much 
present, either. The warehouse manager of Alpha commented: 
 
“Many people tell in developmental discussions how nice it would be to get positive feedback 
when it is appropriate. Well, then I ask them how will it go if you are making collections and I 
come to you and say that now you did very well. I mean, you definitely then think like okay, 
what is wrong with him now.” 
 
Regardless of this perception that the reward system does not create commitment among 
employees the average duration of career at TWS of the interviewees is an astonishing eleven 
years of the fifteen that the company has been operating.  
 
 
Control through culture 
The choices made at TWS regarding organizational structure, delegation, performance 
measurement and compensation provide some insight into how the management is trying to 
ensure that behavior throughout the company is consistent. In fact, these choices set the 
premises that enable entrepreneurial behavior and local adaptation to customer needs because 
only broad boundaries are established. However, besides these quite visible control system 
design choices, the desired behavior is sought to be facilitated by cultural controls. Indeed, it 
seems that these controls are effective since almost without any exception the same kind of 
expressions, same kind of worries about future and pride for one‟s own effort for the unit‟s 
success are repeated over and over again in the stories of the interviewees. In most parts of the 
organization a unique entrepreneurial atmosphere seems to be dominant. A warehouse 
manager at Bravo stated: 
 
”We have been talking about it… […], if this (company) was ours. So what would we do 
differently? I don’t think we could do any better even if this were our own.” 
 
From the very beginning senior management has perceived active promotion of values and 
culture as the most important element of control at TWS. The CEO solidly believes that 
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shared values serve as important controls for the company‟s operations: “If I wouldn’t count 
on that then I… the strategy would look very different.”  
 
Rather than formally and regularly communicated, the values at TWS appear to be more 
implicit. This has been a deliberate choice by the CEO because written values become easily 
detached from actual behavior. Although not explicitly stated, the values at TWS can be 
condensed into three issues: entrepreneurship, trust and mutual respect. Entrepreneurship is a 
necessary value because the other controls provide little structure, incentive or sanction to act 
in a particular way. Broadly defined autonomy and accountability call for entrepreneurial 
mindset from the local CEOs. The relatively loose control and minimum monitoring also 
requires that superiors trust in the skills and ethics of their subordinates. In addition, mutual 
respect is necessary between superiors and subordinates, the functions within a profit center, 
and between profit centers. This is because no mechanistic coordination of these interactions 
exists.  
 
Despite the lack of explicit value statements approximately 75 % of the respondents in the 
latest employee survey answered that they are familiar with the company‟s values and equally 
many felt that their working efforts were aligned with the values and strategy. More 
importantly, more than 95% of the staff responded to this survey, the rate indicating the 
importance of the survey for the employees. Instead of relying on written value statements the 
CEO has sought to promote values and particular culture by role-model-like behavior, as he 
described: 
 
“Passionate talk of course in its own way with one’s own words brings forward, but this type of 
re-ignition of the strategy… that kind of walking the talk, or not exactly that but maintaining 
credibility, it could be said that it is my primary duty in this company.” 
 
Through stories and slogans employees are sought to get engaged in particular behavior. 
Numerous slogans live all around the organization. For instance several interviewees 
somehow referred to the CEO‟s view on the nature of the operational freedom in the 
company, as the business manager of Central and North described: 
 
“He (the CEO) sometimes then said that we have such freedom in operations that in the one end 
we are constrained by our own imagination and in the other end by the Finnish Criminal Act.” 
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The slogan also illustrates trust on the ethics. In fact, the CEO cannot understand such formal 
statements as “we operate according to law”. For him it is self-evident. Moreover, he pointed 
out that:  
 
“It is part of our culture that…We want to say that this company is safe and a good place to 
work. I mean that showing your position, status, or authority does not belong to our culture. We 
fire only if an employee ethically misconducts herself, any other problems (such as alcoholism) 
will be resolved.”    
 
A range of other slogans are circulated within the company. Entrepreneurship is facilitated by 
the phrase “it is easier to apologize than ask permission”, the slogan reflecting allowance for 
trial-and-error behavior and focus on action over planning. A slogan “do not provoke the 
competitor” was often referred to as an explanation why the company grows organically and 
does not want to take benefit of the competitors‟ problems. While the slogan points to 
humility in relation to competitor, the slogan “who has the joy is to hide it” points more 
specifically at humility within the company. Furthermore, equality is promoted by the 
expression “one of the best” whereas “there is fine line between the care and abandonment” 
is about to reinforce the meaning of profit center autonomy. As the CEO explained, other 
slogans have been used more specific purposes:  
 
“We have used internal marketing slogans like: ’The salesman has the authority of a marketing 
director when making a deal’.” 
 
While the CEO has found slogans as an effective way to keep the values alive, he is active 
also in behaving as a role model. The warehouse staff recalled how the CEO has appeared 
into warehouse to just discuss with them. They also recalled how the CEO‟s role model has, 
not perfectly but to great extent, led the other managers to adopt similar type of behavior. The 
CEO has a personal, if not entrepreneurial, touch to the business even though the ownership 
of the company lies rather far in the hands of the European mother group. An excellent 
example of the CEO‟s leadership style is the way he succeeded to convince the Group of not 
initiating any lay-offs or denunciation at TWS during the latest financial crisis, even though 
all other country units of the Group were exercising restructurings. The CEO saw prevailing 
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culture too valuable to be sacrificed and much more severe problems to arise if people were 
laid off. The CFO explained this further: 
 
“In all of our neighboring countries they were cutting down headcount and stuff. Because we 
are operating in a different way we then tried to tell (to the Group) that with our system, our 
organization… we cannot start to cut, we cannot lay people off without the engine starting to 
cough; that it will become much more expensive.” 
 
The CEO, rather than just defending the company against the group, stick his neck out and 
visited each of the profit centers, albeit that required two months his working time. He wanted 
to personally explain, “in his realistic and understandable, non-engineering language”, as a 
purchaser commented, the facts of the situation to employees. He explained to employees that 
he will do anything to avoid lay-offs and encouraged employees to work harder, but did not 
deny the fact that co-operation procedures are taken if nothing else resolves the situation. In 
fact, his message and behavior turned out to be a good remedy for the recession as the 
turnover and gross-margin kept growing. 
 
The slogans and role-model behavior are aimed at keeping values alive and blowing the right 
spirit into the behavior of the employees. The culture is further supported by the way 
everyday operations and routines are arranged at the company. No formal codes of conduct 
nor explicit rules or regulations are dictated by the HQ, which gives room to the 
entrepreneurship as well as trust prevailing in the organization. For example such common 
examples of mutual organization policies as monitoring of working hours or formal procedure 
descriptions are practically completely missing at TWS. The minimum rules are for highly 
exceptional situations such as significantly increasing credit limit of a customer or ordering 
exceptionally high volumes for a large scale customer. 
 
The profit centers have much freedom in organizing their operations and procedures as they 
feel most suitable. Some of them have constructed own task descriptions of critical functions 
while others are relying on tacit knowledge of the old-timers. Recruiting process provides a 
good example of a process to which typically there would be at least some type of directions 
dictated by the headquarters on how the process ought to be carried out, but which in the case 
of TWS has been handled as the CFO described:  
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“Really there haven’t been any aptitude tests; on the contrary, every time recruitments have 
been on, at least during my presence here, it has been more a question of personal type, that 
kind of person who fits into this shop…” 
 
The same aspect was echoed by the CEO: “In my opinion it is far easier to teach skills or 
provide training than change personality.” The focus on personality in personnel selection is 
seen critical, because the organizational spirit and behavior are highly dependent on people, 
rather than the mere organizational design. The CFO commented on this as follows:  
 
”Besides clear culmination into the CEO’s personality, the development of our culture has 
required successful selection of the people involved. In the end it is very much dependent on the 
people how things can be developed.” 
 
The crucial role of personalities became evident in two profit centers, where the managers did 
not enjoy the respect of the employees. This was reflected also onto the performance of the 
profit centers. However, the CEO viewed the situation problematic because, as promised to 
employees, nobody will be laid off as long as there are no ethical problems. This situation 
remains to be solved by the senior management, where for example rearrangement of some of 
the duties of the managers has been considered as an option. 
 
Besides values, the shared experiences through the history seem to play a significant role in 
shaping employee behavior. A significant part of the entire personnel has made a long career 
at the company; many of them have been present since the very beginning of operations. 
While the organization design allows for various subcultures or clans to exist at the profit 
centers, the shared experiences at the company level seem to maintain coherence, as the sales 
manager at Bravo commented: 
 
“We have been able to maintain a good spirit. We have experienced upturn and now during the 
last few years markets going down. And I don’t think it has been visible in the feeling: we are 
all still in the same boat and we haven’t started to pull into different directions.” 
 
This strong cultural cohesion does not stem from traditional visible symbolic controls put in 
place by the company, such as consistent designs and interiors at offices around the country, 
as a profit center (Bravo) manager commented:  
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“The company image is not standardized which can be weakness. But if you consider a typical 
customer here, that guy hardly gets kicks of the similar office elsewhere. I mean that locality 
may be a value as such.” 
 
The CFO explained how the company image is used for managing customer interface rather 
than cultural belongingness:  
 
”Our offices look quite different; there is no standard for visual outlook. […] We want to signal 
that we are working here to serve you and we have just the suitable facilities for that.” 
 
Even though cultural controls such as role-model behavior, slogans, and personnel selection 
play a role in shaping the behavior within the more broad management control premises, these 
premises not only enable particular behaviors to arise but also affect behavior. The profit 
center as a mini-company, the rewards based on its financial results, and most importantly, 
the distribution of rewards somewhat equally to employees within a profit center, seem to 
affect the sense of responsibility. A purchaser of Bravo commented: 
 
“EVA is a measure that is rewarding, I mean, makes you feel that now we have done right 
things. And it motivates you to continue the next year.” 
 
While EVA-based financial rewards motivate employees to varying extent, the purchaser 
continued on the meanings due to evaluating and rewarding profit center as a team: 
 
“I don’t look at the business only from purchasing perspective. Instead I do worry about 
outbound logistics and other issues related to sales, even though these matters do not belong to 
my responsibilities. I think about them anyway. I think more broadly our business.”  
 
Another purchaser at Echo explained her perception of the success by stating:  
 
“I am interested in knowing how we are performing. We analyze our results, especially sales. It 
is sum of everything. But it is not only the merit of the sales, but result of the joint effort from 
warehouse to truck drivers. It is on everyone’s credit.” 
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While rewards seem to direct employees towards sharing responsibility within profit centers, 
the existence of the rewards seems to facilitate entrepreneurial action. The purchaser 
continued: “Even if we did not receive the reward, certainly we have tried to do our best to 
get it.” The design of rewarding system focuses on profit center. While rewards set an 
incentive for self-interest, many respondents were concerned of the whole, as a warehouse 
manager at Bravo commented: 
 
“It is our profit center and the whole company. […] If something is our advantage but not the 
advantage of the whole company, you need choose for the whole. You need to look at it this 
way.” 
 
It seems that shared responsibility for the company performance is due to the excellent 
financial performance operating as a buffer against the corporate pressures. The CEO 
explained the actual meaning of strong performance: 
 
“On the other hand if you continuously keep growing faster than the market, keep winning 
market share, and there is a world of difference in terms of ROI between you and any of your 
competitors in Finland, then we have been leaning on the fact that these are sufficient signals of 
us not being entirely wrong yet, so to speak.” 
 
People seem to be aware that if the company EVA decreases, the CEO is unable to defend the 
quite unique operating model against corporate standardization and budgetary control 
pressures. Whilst people are committed to their targets, i.e. profit center EVA, they are also 
committed to the company. They have been actively creating the story of the company from 
the beginning, which has created the sense of family, as a purchaser at Bravo commented: 
“Once you have started with pencil, from scratch, with these people, it establishes affinity.” 
She further continued: 
 
”We are a family because we have been long together. The personnel turnover is low. You know 
these people and you can read so much from their faces.”  
 
The long careers in the company, in turn, seem to be explained by the organization design, as 
a purchaser at Delta explained: 
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 “We have been allowed to do this (profit center) in our way. The people are extremely 
committed because they have been and still are able to affect their doings.” 
 
Finally, a purchaser at Echo with a 15-year experience echoed the commitment as follows:  
 
“There is no Monday morning I had felt uncomfortable to go to work. […] It is our gang, the 
atmosphere.”     
 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
In this section the narrative described above is attempted to be drawn together by discussing 
the findings related to the objectives of this study.  
 
First of all, an objective of interest was to examine what explains the occurrence of a 
particular control configuration. The conventional viewpoint of a cybernetic-based
4
 control 
system has been prevailing in management control literature, if not explicitly, at least 
implicitly (Green & Welsh, 1988; Flamholtz, 1983; Otley, 1999). Moreover, much of the 
management control literature builds on the assumption that strategy or objectives determine 
the MCS package (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Ittner & Larcker, 2001; Ferreira and Otley, 2009; 
see also Chenhall, 2003). The MCS package implemented at TWS, however, does not seem to 
conform to this view, since the only formal objective of the company, to grow five percent 
faster than the market, or the strategic critical success factors of superior customer service and 
most cost-efficient operating model are not directly visible in any of the concrete control 
choices made. More specifically, the only performance measure in use at the company, 
namely EVA, cannot be directly linked to these objectives. The entire package of controls 
cannot be seen leaning as much into the cybernetic-based thinking as perhaps traditionally has 
been the view in MCS research. Therefore, the control choices made cannot be explained by 
the desire to meet the company‟s objectives through goal alignment. 
 
                                                 
4
 See e.g. Hofstede, 1978. 
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Instead, accordingly to the definition of MCS presented by Merchant and Van der Stede 
(2007), the objective to reach behavioral congruence rather than goal congruence seems to be 
the explaining factor of TWS‟s control choices. The impression gained from TWS‟s vision 
statement suggests that the main objective of control seems to be to create an entrepreneurial 
mindset according to which the behavior of the employees should be aligned. This 
entrepreneurial behavior is in the vision seen as the primary means for achieving the targets of 
superior customer service and cost-efficiency.  
 
The entrepreneurial mindset is pursued with various control elements. First of all, the 
structural choice of decentralizing all of the key operational functions was made in order to 
differentiate TWS from its competitors and to aim for superiority in pick-up commerce. 
However, without the extensive delegation of decision rights and thus placing the decision 
power in the front line, the functional decentralization would not have been of much use in 
creating independent and customer-focused behavior. The freedom granted to subordinates 
regarding decision-making signals them appreciation of entrepreneurship. The employees are 
expected to consider the full range of variables, from customers and suppliers to business and 
support functions. They are expected to carry responsibility but not limited of trying 
something new. This is essentially complemented with measuring performance with EVA, 
which allows the independent decision-making regarding trade-offs between revenues, 
operative expenses and capital costs. In addition, since the incentive compensation as well is 
solely based on the EVA produced by one‟s unit without any upper limits, it signals an 
entrepreneur-like thinking on getting rewarded more for a better performance and not playing 
games with the desired or adequate level of profits. An element of uncertainty – a 
fundamental feature of entrepreneurship – is brought to the incentive system with the 
subjective evaluation as the basis for one third of the annual bonus. The combination of 
performance measurement, evaluation and rewards directs attention at the achievement of 
profitability while the means remains unspecified. The MCS design establishes motivation in 
terms of entrepreneurship whilst it also directs attention at the company objectives. 
 
This entrepreneurial mindset is further complemented by grass-root level fine-tuning of 
cultural controls. The active shaping of culture by the means of delivering values into the 
organization using slogans and role-model-like behavior is all aimed at increasing the 
independent atmosphere. The culture with its shared values allows the decision power to be 
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decentralized all over the company, because the people can be trusted and motivated to do 
their best every day. If the prevailing organizational culture was entirely different and 
motivation created only through financial rewards, then probably this wide delegation would 
not work as well towards entrepreneurial thinking. And vice versa, because authority is given 
to the employees they feel appreciated and thus foster even further the atmosphere of 
entrepreneurship and commitment.  
 
From this behavioral perspective the above described MCS choices seem to be coherently 
aiming towards encouraging value-based behavior and, consequently, towards the strategic 
targets of the company. Although the controls as such independently do not necessarily direct 
towards the organizational goals, their mutual consistent signal towards entrepreneur-like 
behavior provides the means to achieve the targets and thus aiming towards realizing the 
vision. Therefore, consistently with Abernethy and Chua (1996) and Mundy (2010) these 
above described MCS choices can be regarded internally consistent and thus mutually 
reinforcing and complementing each other. This core structure of the MCS package serves 
two purposes of management control simultaneously: motivation and direction setting. The 
definition in the managerial literature (Porter & Siggelkow, 2008) on consistency can also be 
identified in this case, since for example the CEO sees the design of the incentive 
compensation system as something that maybe should be reconsidered, but something he does 
not dare to change because it could jeopardize the balance of the entire control system. 
Another example is that more limited decision rights would make broad performance 
measurement less meaningful and lead easily to frustration and motivational problems. Thus 
introduction of any additional controls or changing the nature of the existing ones would 
probably result in a decrease in the entrepreneurship and clarity of direction. Referring to the 
metaphor by Brickley et al. (1997) it can be questioned what would happen to the balance of 
the three-legged stool if one of the legs were shortened dramatically. Therefore, we argue that 
these controls are complementary to each other in aligning the behavior of the organizational 
actors. 
 
As many of the MCS package descriptive frameworks suggest, the variety of MCS present at 
a company can many times be vast. At TWS this is seen as well: besides the above described 
control components there are a number of other elements that fall into the classifications of 
the types of MCS. However, the control effect of these elements is not necessarily a direct or 
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a strong one, but rather supporting in regard with the complementary choices described 
above. At TWS planning and annual budgeting appear to possess this type of a less significant 
role in controlling the organizational behavior. Plans and budgets are neither consolidated nor 
prepared for the head office, but rather built for the own purposes of the profit centers, thus 
leaving space for the independent decision-making of the units. Budgeting is directly 
mentioned and aimed at only providing the profit center managers a chance to “stop and think 
about the future”, instead of setting performance targets to strictly direct the actions with 
rewards or sanctions. The profit center managers do not see budgeting as an important feature 
either, and rather compare the performance of the units to previous trends. Based on this we 
argue that those controls that could be removed from the package without causing changes in 
the entrepreneurial signal sent by the core package are of weaker relationship and importance. 
Thus these controls could be labeled as supplementary controls, because they do help in 
reinforcing the desired control effect of the primary controls, or at least do not prevent it, but 
their removal would not cause changes in control effect.  
 
Therefore, this study proposes a hierarchy between the complementary relationships of the 
control choices in an organization. Based on the evidence of the case study it is argued that 
the strongest alignment between MCS is found between those elements that are behaviorally 
aligned giving the same signal to the organizational actors in guiding their behavior and thus 
as mutually reinforcing elements act as complements to each other. The analysis of the 
interactions at TWS points out that the choices on delegation, performance measurement, 
performance evaluation and rewarding are complementary in that of serving the vision of 
entrepreneurial behavior. The entrepreneurship, in turn, contributes to motivation and 
commitment of employees whose attention is primarily directed by the aforementioned 
choices. These primary complementary controls form the core of the MCS package. The core 
level of controls identified in this case seems to be consistent with the findings of Widener et 
al. (2008) on the complementarities of the three core components of organizational design. 
However, cultural controls are identified to be an essential part of the core control system, 
complementing the design components significantly in fostering aligned behavior. This is in 
line with the notion by Merchant and Van der Stede (2007, p. 92), who note that while 
empowering employees has become the main direction in the organizations instead of 
rigorous hierarchies and action based controls, the importance of organizational values has 
increased dramatically in ensuring that people are acting in the organization‟s best interest. 
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The importance of organizational culture as part of the control configurations has been stated 
by many other scholars as well (e.g. Kunda, 1992; Flamholtz, 1983; Malmi & Brown, 2008). 
 
The secondary level of complementary relationships seems to consist of controls bringing 
extra insurance to the signal sent by the core MCS configuration. However, we argue that 
their absence would probably not significantly change the signal. For example if annual 
budgeting were to be removed at TWS, it can be speculated that it would not probably 
decrease the intensity of the entrepreneurial signal very much, since employees do not 
perceive the budget to be directing their behavior. In addition these secondary choices are not 
directly aimed towards aligning the behavior of the employees towards entrepreneurship, but 
rather towards self-control and support. Therefore, these choices are labeled as supplements, 
indicating a complementary relationship to the primary control elements, but because the 
behavioral alignment is not present the distinction between complements and supplements is 
introduced.  
 
Prior MCS literature has identified subtle findings on the different importance of MCS 
elements as well. Sandelin (2008) identified a primary mode of control with regard to 
secondary ones, and Simons (2005) implicitly argued for the need for supplementary controls 
ensuring ethical behavior when the entrepreneurial gap in targets is present.  Abernethy and 
Chua (1996) noticed that accounting control systems were not playing a particularly important 
role in controlling the organization, but were regarded as rationalizing and supplementing 
other more visible elements of the package. Finally, Mundy (2010) also concluded that belief 
systems exercised a powerful influence over other types of control in her case study. 
Therefore, the notion of difference in the strength of the interrelationships is backed up by 
previous studies, and now further elaborated with the distinction of the strength being defined 
through the behavioral alignment concept. 
 
As an additional notice, some of the controls present in our empirical data, such as steering 
groups, monthly performance reviews by management board and monthly reporting to profit 
centers are not MCS as such, because they do not ensure by any means desired employee 
behavior (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2007; Malmi & Brown, 2008). Accordingly to the 
distinction by Malmi and Brown they can be regarded as decision support systems that 
support the core MCS structure. Their role is not, however, insignificant. For instance, 
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reporting to profit centers is necessary so that subordinates can receive feedback, yet drawing 
the conclusions and making decisions about what the right things to do are remain their sole 
responsibility. Therefore, these decision support systems realize the third purpose of MCS: to 
help employees overcome personal limitations. We argue that when investigating the 
relationships inside package of controls it is important to notice this distinction between 
controls and decision support systems. 
 
Finally, the findings at TWS demonstrate how a rigorous cybernetics-based system is not 
necessarily the only way to construct a well-functioning control system package. With an 
extremely simple system where cultural controls and autonomy are emphasized instead of 
placing dozens of accurate measures and targets in place the organization seems to be 
controlled (and performing) just fine. Thus the design of the MCS package at TWS seems to 
be somewhat substituting for a more tightly coupled formal cybernetic system. This 
observation is consistent with previous MCS theoretical research as well: researchers have 
suggested that especially shared values and beliefs in organizational cultures can reduce or 
substitute the needs for a tight formal control system (Fisher, 1995; Merchant & Van der 
Stede, 2007, p. 91). However, despite the nature of the control at TWS is more of self-
controlling than senior management dictating rules and procedures, the desired targets and 
feedback are still communicated to the people through different control and decision support 
systems, so entirely the thought of cybernetics can not be thrown away. Instead, cybernetic 
principles just perhaps lie more subtle in the control system package and the basic idea of 
setting targets and finally getting feedback is after all realized, but through means of self-
control. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Although management control has been subject for considerable amount of research recently, 
previous research has been lacking in-depth analysis on the interrelationships between control 
components from a holistic viewpoint. This study sought to provide a comprehensive 
description of a MCS package configuration in a case company with a focus on analyzing 
how different control systems relate to each other and which of the interrelationships are more 
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crucial than others. The study has the potential to contribute to our understanding on the 
nature and intensity of MCS linkages through arguing that it is important to distinguish 
between different types of complementarity. Consequently, a distinction between 
complementary and supplementary controls was presented.  
 
Firstly, those controls with consistent signals towards a desired type of behavior are argued to 
form the core of the company‟s control system. This is because through the behavioral 
alignment organizational objectives are thought to be attained more easily. These control 
elements are defined as complements to each other, since it can be speculated that if any of 
the controls would be altered the signal would be affected with the change. Secondly, 
supplementary controls were identified as those controls that support the core control package 
but do not as themselves directly align the behavior accordingly. Therefore it is argued that 
these controls could be removed from the package without significantly changing the signal 
sent by the entire control package. Finally, this study argues for an alternative option to 
prescriptive cybernetics-based target-plan-feedback thinking in management control research 
by demonstrating a responsive way of practicing management control. With these findings the 
study goes beyond mere description what is and contributes to our knowledge by providing 
theoretical ideas about why and how MCS elements are related in a certain way. 
 
Since this paper only investigates the operation of MCS package in one case company, the 
analysis has the opportunity to reach deeper than by surveying several companies. The large 
number of interviews conducted, as well as the secondary empirical data available provide 
significant reinforcement to the reliability of the data because over time same kinds of 
answers were repeated from different parts and organizational levels of the case organization. 
The possibility to afterwards revise unclear issues from the case company assisted in gaining 
sufficient empirical evidence for this study as well. In addition, the size and fairly simple 
structure of the case company provided an excellent basis for investigating MCS as a 
package, because the specification and analysis of all the potential interrelationships in a 
complex and manifold organization would definitely be challenging. As a part of a large 
multinational the results indicated by the case company could be speculated to be possible and 
comparable in other types of divisional parts of organizations as well.  
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The study does not come without limitations, however. Of course, generalizations can rarely 
be made based on a study of a single company. Instead, we have sought to draw theoretical 
generalizations. The data is cross-sectional, but we do not see it as a problem, because we are 
not theorizing about longitudinal cause-and-effect relationships. Finally, we want to stress 
that the illustrated MCS package is not argued to be an optimal configuration of control, at 
least if perfect control is the criteria, because clear evidence of suboptimizational behavior 
was found in the study. Furthermore, it is important to notice that the findings of this study 
only provide one description of MCS configuration in a certain context. The concept of 
equifinality suggests that differently composed packages can prove equally effective even in 
the face of similar contingencies (Sandelin, 2008). This is why several empirical studies are 
needed for collecting the knowledge of the various possibilities in configuring MCS 
packages.  
 
We encourage future studies to pay attention to signals and roles played by the MCS together 
and alone, because we believe, that understanding their nature and purpose is the precondition 
for understanding their meaning in the context of the entire package of controls. A more 
specific intriguing line of research would be examining MCS package over time to see if 
some controls are more likely to remain in place through time than others and how potential 
changes in the control mix potentially affects the mutual control effect of the entire control 
package.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: List of interviews 
Business  
Region 
Profit 
Center 
Position Date and duration 
 Headquarters CEO 
 
 
 
 
CFO 
Purchasing Director 
Founding Member 
Controller 
21.1.2010    1h 30 min  
29.1.2010    2h 10 min 
4.3.2010      0h 40 min 
2.7.2010      1h 20 min 
19.8.2010    3h 10 min 
31.5.2010    1h 55 min 
7.6.2010      1h 35 min 
18.6.2010    1h 40 min 
24.6.2010    2h 10 min 
South Alpha Business Manager/Profit Center Manager 
Warehouse Manager 
Warehouse Complaints 
Logistics Developer 
Sales Manager 
Salesman 
22.6.2010    1h 15 min 
22.6.2010    1h 20 min 
22.6.2010    0h 45 min 
22.6.2010    0h 50 min 
22.6.2010    0h 55 min 
22.6.2010    0h 55 min 
South-
West 
Bravo Business Manager/Profit Center Manager  
Warehouse Manager 
Purchaser 
Sales Manager 
Salesman 
1.6.2010      1h 30 min 
1.6.2010      0h 55 min 
1.6.2010      0h 55 min 
1.6.2010      0h 55 min 
1.6.2010      1h 00 min 
East Charlie Business Manager 
Profit Center Manager 
Warehouse Manager 
Purchasing Manager 
Salesman 
8.6.2010      1h 30 min 
8.6.2010      1h 20 min 
8.6.2010      0h 50 min 
8.6.2010      0h 45 min 
8.6.2010      0h 50 min 
Central 
and 
North 
Delta Business Manager 
Profit Center Manager 
Warehouse Manager 
Purchasing Manager 
Salesman 
21.6.2010    1h 35 min 
21.6.2010    1h 10 min 
21.6.2010    0h 40 min 
21.6.2010    1h 00 min 
21.6.2010    0h 35 min 
Echo Profit Center Manager 
Warehouse Manager 
Purchaser 
Salesman 
Salesman 
9.6.2010      2h 15 min 
9.6.2010      0h 45 min 
9.6.2010      0h 55 min 
9.6.2010      0h 50 min 
9.6.2010      0h 35 min 
Total:    35              43h 00 min 
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Appendix B: Interview outline 
The interviews were conducted around the following themes, with variations and expansions 
when needed: 
 
STRATEGIC ISSUES 
- How do you see the company‟s strategy in your work? 
- How do you know you are doing the right things? What kind of targets have you been 
given? Are you being measured for your performance? 
- Does EVA motivate/commit you? 
- Issues in budgeting and reporting practices 
 
 
POWER 
- Decision power and how it is delegated 
- Restrictions faced in operations, e.g. power, money, time, lack of support 
 
 
RESPONSIBILITY 
- What do you feel you are responsible for in your work? 
- How does the responsibility occur? Through measurement, rewards etc. 
- What kinds of measures and targets are there? 
 
 
INFLUENCE 
- Do you feel you can influence in changing issues? 
- Participation in projects, cooperation with others 
- Do you feel you gain enough information regarding organizational issues? Where do 
you get the information you need? 
 
 
SUPPORT 
- How/when do you get support in your work? 
- What motivates you?  
- How committed do you feel to the company? 
- Do you enjoy working here? How do you like the atmosphere? 
 
 
FUTURE 
- Beliefs, worries and challenges 
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